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choices? Physicians are not, shall we say, the world’s greatest fans of arbitration. It turns out that regulatory
policies and practices, in other words politics, provide one important reason why physicians prefer to avoid
arbitration. And there are additional reasons that explain why this particular group of service providers has not
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION: 
NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL	  
By 
David Allen Larson* 
Dr. David Dahl** 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The authors hope that no one still seriously contends that politics do not affect 
arbitration.  In fact, it frankly is difficult to understand the most recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions addressing arbitration unless one appreciates how those 
decisions further the interests of the business community.  One cannot make bold 
assertions of this nature without at least some explanation, of course, and more discussion 
will follow.  But the primary focus of this article is on an interesting exception to 
businesses’, employers’, and service providers’ seemingly universal embrace of 
arbitration processes, particularly mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.  Although it may be 
difficult to believe given arbitration’s current popularity, not everyone requires his or her 
clients to sign mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In fact, some service 
providers prefer to avoid arbitration regardless of whether it is arranged pre- or post-
dispute.  So which merchants or service providers are choosing to forgo arbitration and, 
more importantly, why do they dislike arbitration? And do politics have anything to with 
their choices? 
Dictionaries generally provide several different definitions for the word “politics.” 
Merriam-Webster, for example, offers no fewer than five different definitions with ten 
separate subparts in its “Full Definition” Section.1  The second definition provided 
explains that politics can be “political actions, practices, or policies.”2 Although perhaps 
not the most informative definition one can imagine, it is helpful for our purposes.  
Physicians are not, shall we say, the world’s greatest fans of arbitration.  It turns out that 
regulatory policies and practices, in other words politics, provide one important reason 
why physicians prefer to avoid arbitration. And there are additional reasons that explain 
why this particular group of service providers has not followed the “mad rush” to 
arbitration.  This article will explain why at least one group of service providers, 
physicians, do not regard arbitration as the answer to all of their prayers.   
                                                
* David Allen Larson is a Professor of Law at the Mitchell | Hamline School of Law, former Director and 
Senior Fellow of the Dispute Resolution Institute, and a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation.  His 
publications are available at http://ssrn.com/author=709717 and his profile is at 
http://mitchellhamline.edu/biographies/person/david-larson/.  
** David Dahl is a practicing nephrologist who earned his MD at the University of Minnesota in 1982.  He 
will graduate from the Mitchell | Hamline School of Law and earn his JD in May 2016. 
1 Dictionary entry for “politics,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/politics 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2016). 
2 Id.  
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Arbitration clauses frequently appear in consumer and employment contracts,3  
and they are not unknown in the healthcare field.  Nursing homes and similar facilities 
use binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses to reduce litigation expenses.4 Contracts 
between patients and individual medical providers, however, are a conspicuous exception 
to the otherwise ever-increasing practice of inserting pre-dispute, binding arbitration 
agreements into contracts.5  
Some commentators believe that eventually medical malpractice will be resolved 
in arbitration. Professor Myriam Gilles has suggested, for instance, that “all manner of 
tort claims (including negligence, loss of chance, and other allegations of medical 
malpractice . . .) could soon be hashed out in the sequestered universe of arbitration.”6  
But the authors do not anticipate that physicians will embrace arbitration anytime soon.   
On the one hand, is this situation merely the result of old habits dying hard? If so, 
then we can expect that eventually mandatory arbitration clauses will appear in 
physician-patient contracts much more frequently than they do today.  Yet on the other 
hand, is there something about arbitration that is so unattractive for physicians that they 
will make every effort to avoid it?  Keeping in mind that the medical providers are the 
ones drafting, and thus controlling, the arbitration clauses, is it not possible to craft 
arbitration clauses that provide the same benefits enjoyed by numerous businesses and 
employers?  Perhaps surprisingly, at least at the present time the answer appears to be 
“no.”  
Many of the assumed advantages of arbitration such as faster resolutions, lower 
costs, and greater confidentiality may not be as compelling when it comes to medical 
malpractice claims.  First, litigation outcomes are generally quite positive for physicians. 
                                                
3 It is difficult to quantify the prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration contracts. David S. Schwartz, 
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1284 (2009). Nevertheless, Professor 
Schwartz cites researchers who have attempted to assess the frequency of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and 
Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 408 (2007) (explaining that fifteen to twenty-five percent of 
employers use mandatory arbitration contracts); Linda J Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to 
Arbitrate Through Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-64 (2004) (finding that about thirty-five percent of businesses an average Los 
Angeles consumer might patronize used mandatory arbitration contracts, with the greatest prevalence 
(sixty-nine percent) in the financial category). More frequently, scholars give qualitative estimates. See, 
e.g., Myriam Gilles, Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims, 15 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRES L. 671, 678 (2014) (asserting that arbitration clauses are “ubiquitous” in consumer contracts 
outside of healthcare). 
4 Gilles, supra note 3, at 672-74 (reviewing the use of binding pre-dispute arbitration by nursing homes and 
similar healthcare facilities). 
5 Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury Is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 334 (2007) (stating that it is “not yet common” to employ 
arbitration in medical malpractice disputes); Gilles, supra note 3, at 681-82 (binding arbitration clauses are 
“conspicuously absent from most healthcare contracts”); Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration 
in the New Millenium: Much Ado About Nothing, PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 45, 50 (2000) (stating that 
“arbitration has not been widely used” in medical malpractice); Thomas Pedroni & Ruth F. Vadi, 
Mandatory Arbitration or Mediation of Health Care Liability Claims?, 39 MD. BAR J. 54, 57-58 (2006) 
(listing twenty states with no reported case law regarding medical malpractice arbitration). 
6 Gilles, supra note 3, at 676.  
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Physicians understandably are reluctant to accept different resolution processes when 
they are not convinced that the outcomes will be equally favorable, much less even better. 
Second, physicians generally are shielded from litigation expenses by malpractice 
insurance. Thus, arguments about the reduced costs of arbitration are not persuasive to 
physicians. Third, while disputes may be resolved more quickly with arbitration than they 
would be through litigation, other commonly reported advantages of arbitration—such as 
the ability to select your decision-maker, the availability of neutrals with specific 
expertise, and privacy—may seem illusory to the physician. Finally, because of the 
regulatory environment, in other words “politics,” physicians are very wary of, and 
opposed to, compromise judgments and awards in malpractice cases. The perception that 
arbitration often results in a compromise decision, a proverbial “splitting of the baby,” 
makes arbitration uniquely unattractive to physicians seeking complete vindication for 
both professional and personal reasons.  
II.   MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE ARBITRABLE 
A.   In General 
Courts enforce binding, pre-dispute arbitration agreements routinely and medical 
malpractice arbitration agreements are not treated differently.7  The goal of this article is 
not to review and summarize the United States Supreme Court’s willingness over the past 
three decades to assert the pre-emptive reach of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and 
enforce pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses even when they include controversial 
language such as class action waivers.  But a brief review of two of the most recent cases 
nonetheless may be helpful, and will suffice to prove the point that this Court believes a 
contract should be enforced, particularly if it is an arbitration contract. 
In December 2015, the United States Supreme Court rejected the California Court 
of Appeal’s determination that a service agreement’s binding arbitration clause 
containing a class-arbitration waiver was unenforceable.  The agreement at issue in 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,8 did state that it shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act.  But the immediately preceding contract section also stated “that if the ‘law of your 
state’ makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire arbitration 
provision ‘is unenforceable’.”9  When DIRECTV drafted the service agreement and at the 
time the class action litigation began, class-arbitration bars like this one were regarded as 
unconscionable and unenforceable under California law.10   
                                                
7 Marmet Health Care v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“The [FAA] statute’s text includes no 
exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims.”). 
8 DIRECTV Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
9 Id. at 466. 
10 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
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As Justice Ginsburg in her dissent explained,11 this class action litigation had been 
underway for almost three years when the Court decided AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion12 
and declared that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state rules that make class-
arbitration bans unenforceable.  Acknowledging that the phrase “the law of your state” 
was ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean “the law of your state to the extent it is 
not pre-empted by the FAA,” or “the law of your state without considering the pre-
emptive effect, if any, of the FAA,” the court of appeals had interpreted the phrase 
against the interest of the adhesive contract drafter DIRECTV.13                                               
When contract interpretation questions arise we generally and correctly attempt to 
determine the intent of the parties.  If that truly is our concern, then it is genuinely 
difficult to imagine how a court could conclude that when these parties signed this 
contract in 2007, they not only somehow knew that four years later the Supreme Court 
would announce that the FAA pre-empts state law bans on compelled class action 
waivers, but that they also wrote that understanding into their contract.14  It is infinitely 
more likely that the parties intended the phrase to refer to the law as it existed at the time 
that they signed their contract, unaffected by a federal pre-emptive reach that would not 
be declared until years later.   
In what must be seen as an effort to preserve the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement, however, the majority framed the question as whether “the law of your state,” 
can include an invalid law.15  The Court then answered that question by asserting 
(speculating?) that California courts would never have made a similar interpretation if 
another type of contract other than an arbitration contract had been involved, and thus 
failed to place arbitration contracts on equal footing with other contracts.16  Adding that 
judicial construction of a statute ordinarily applies retroactively and that the phrase “law 
of your state” is not ambiguous, the Court remanded and demanded that the court of 
appeals enforce the arbitration agreement.17 
Although some might agree with the majority, if arbitration is a “creature of 
contract” then the authors maintain that the parties agreed to a contract that should not 
have been enforced.  Yet the majority was determined to ensure that this binding 
arbitration contract was not going to be avoided.  Quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.18 and Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v Board of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,19 Justice Ginsburg reminds us that arbitration must be 
                                                
11 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
12 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
13 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 469. 
16 Id. at 469-471. 
17 Id. at 471. 
18 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2011). 
19 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
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based upon “consent, not coercion,” and that “the interpretation of private contracts is 
ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.”20  There was 
no reason to refer to a consumer’s state law if DIRECTV intended to incorporate state 
law as preempted by the FAA.21 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,22 the Court also reviewed 
an arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver. Merchants filed a class 
action claiming a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. When American Express 
moved to compel individual arbitration, the merchants submitted an economist’s 
declaration estimating that the cost of an essential expert analysis would be from several 
hundred thousand to more than one million dollars although an individual plaintiff’s 
recovery would be only $12,850, or $38,549 trebled.23  Although the district court 
dismissed the lawsuits, the court of appeals reversed and held that because the parties 
would face prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate, the class action waiver was 
unenforceable.24   
The Supreme Court responded, however, by declaring that “the antitrust laws do 
not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”25  The 
Court limited the possibility of escaping an arbitration contract when a party could not 
effectively enforce a statutory right in arbitration, the “effective vindication” exception, 
by stating that the exception only preserved a party’s “right to pursue” a statutory 
remedy.  The fact that it was financially infeasible or even impossible to prove a statutory 
violation does not change the fact that the right to pursue the remedy was not 
eliminated.26  
Although the majority distinguished the case, the dissent maintained that the 
language and logic of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.27 is 
undeniable.  Citing well-known Supreme Court cases, the dissent explained that the 
critical justification for permitting statutory claims to be decided in arbitration is that “a 
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.”28  Arbitration clauses should 
be enforced only if “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause 
of action in the arbitral forum.”29  The arbitration agreement should be set aside if 
                                                
20 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
21 Id. at 474 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
22 Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
23 Id. at 2308. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 2309. 
26 Id. at 2311. 
27 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
28 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628). 
29 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637). 
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arbitration would be so difficult that the claimant “will for all practical purposes be 
deprived of his day in court.”30  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph further 
confirmed that arbitration costs so prohibitive they foreclose consideration of statutory 
claims would violate the effective-vindication rule and prevent enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement.31 
The most important reason for including the preceding brief discussion of two 
United States Supreme Court arbitration cases in this article is not to persuade the reader 
that they were wrongly decided.  Rather, the reason this discussion is included to 
illustrate the Supreme Court’s determination to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses 
even in the face of strong arguments against enforcement.  These cases demonstrate that 
the Court will make every effort to enforce arbitration agreements as written. 
Thus, the current situation is that courts enforce binding, pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements routinely and, as one should expect, medical malpractice arbitration 
agreements are not an exception.32  Marmet Healthcare v. Brown, for example, was a 
medical malpractice action against a nursing home in which the United States Supreme 
Court pre-empted a state legislature’s attempt to limit pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration.33 The Court declared that West Virginia’s state law “prohibition against pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing 
homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that 
rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act].”34    
In fact, in order to ensure enforceability, the validity of medical malpractice 
arbitration agreements has been recognized by statute in thirteen states, including 
California.35  California courts, in turn, have upheld arbitration awards to both plaintiffs 
and named physician defendants.36  Arbitration agreements mandating arbitration of 
medical malpractice cases have been upheld in other states as well.37 
                                                
30 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 632). 
31 Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Greentree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)). 
32 Marmet Health Care v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“The [FAA] statute’s text contains no 
exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1204. The case ultimately was remanded, however, to determine whether the arbitration clauses 
were unenforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted 
by the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. 
35 David Shieh, Unintended Side Effects: Arbitration and the Deterrence of Medical Error, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1806, 1808-09 (2014). 
36 E.g., Anderson v. Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, No. B252061, 2015 WL 139728 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
12, 2015) (finding that arbitrator did not deny plaintiff’s request for a continuance, and upholding 
arbitrator’s award to physician defendant); Watson v. Knorr, No. H036430, 2013 WL 1944007 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 13, 2013) (holding that it was for the arbitrator to determine both entitlement to and amount of 
costs to be awarded and upholding award of $1,092,797 plus costs to plaintiff against urologist defendant).  
37 E.g., Gordon v. Shield, 41 So. 3d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that surgeon did not waive right 
to arbitrate by participating in pre-suit investigation required by statute); King v. Bryant, 737 S.E.2d 802 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that arbitration agreement was not too indefinite to enforce in a malpractice 
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The absence of a state statute specifically authorizing pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate medical malpractice disputes is not a barrier to enforcement of such agreements.  
As is apparent from the recent cases noted above, the Federal Arbitration Act has been 
interpreted expansively in order to uphold pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  
Additionally, all fifty states have enacted statutes ensuring the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in general.38 These statutes and judicial decisions provide strong 
authority for enforcing pre-dispute medical malpractice arbitration agreements.39 
B.   Arguments to Avoid Enforcement Rarely Succeed 
No one should be surprised that agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice 
disputes are enforceable.40 Although Section 2 of the FAA does state that agreements to 
arbitrate are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,”41 and although some commentators assert that courts remain 
“enraptured” with contract defenses such as unconscionability,42 it has proven very 
difficult to escape arbitration clauses asserting contract defenses. Unconscionability 
arguments may appear particularly promising because pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
clauses frequently are found in contracts that are adhesive in nature, yet those arguments 
rarely are successful.43 In an effort to protect their citizens, state legislatures may enact 
legislation expressly limiting the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  But, as 
was the case in Marmet Health Care v. Brown, those statutes will be pre-empted because 
the court likely will be unable to find that the agreements are “unenforceable under state 
common law principles that are not specific to arbitration.”44  
Attempts to escape medical malpractice arbitration clauses are occasionally 
successful, however. California courts, for instance, have denied motions to compel 
arbitration in medical malpractice actions against physicians where waiver or bias has 
been found despite a valid pre-dispute arbitration agreement.45 In another situation, where 
                                                                                                                                            
action against surgeon); Fleming v. Simper, 158 P.3d 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (holding that patient did 
not provide clear and convincing evidence that arbitration judgment was procured through fraud).  
38 Pedroni & Vadi, supra note 5, at 56. 
39 Id. at 57. 
40 Gilles, supra note 3, at 689.  
41 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016). 
42 Gilles, supra note 3, at 689. 
43 Id. at 688-89. 
44 Marmet Health Care v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012) (disallowing a categorical rule against pre-
dispute arbitration agreements).  
45 Law v. Gorny, No. G046953, 2013 WL 1561512, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2013) (holding that 
defendant obstetrician waived his contractual right to arbitration by participating in judicial discovery and 
thus prejudicing plaintiff); Gray v. Chiu, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that 
defendant surgeon’s attorney’s undisclosed membership in the same alternative dispute resolution firm as 
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none of the defendant physicians had actually signed the arbitration agreement, the 
California Court of Appeal refused to order arbitration because the physicians were 
unable to establish that they were parties to a valid arbitration agreement—there was no 
signature on the line for “Physician’s or Authorized Representative’s Signature.”46 
C.   Are Wrongful Death Actions Arbitrable? 
While the legal authority supporting arbitration of medical malpractice actions is 
substantial, an important issue concerning medical malpractice and arbitration remains 
unsettled. In a wrongful death suit, can a plaintiff-survivor be bound by an arbitration 
agreement signed by the decedent?  
In California, the answer is yes. In Ruiz v. Podolsky, claimants filed a wrongful 
death action against the surgeon who treated decedent.47 Decedent and surgeon had 
signed an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims that stated it was the parties’ 
intention to bind all parties, including spouse and heirs, to arbitrate any claim arising out 
of treatment provided by the surgeon.48 The California Supreme Court held that the 
state’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act allowed patients to bind heirs making 
wrongful death claims to arbitration agreements.49 The supreme courts of Florida and 
Alabama have come to similar conclusions in cases involving wrongful death actions 
against nursing homes.50  
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has rejected that position for several different 
reasons.   In Bybee v. Abdulla, surviving spouse Lisa Bybee filed a wrongful death action 
against the physician who had treated her decedent husband Mark for depression.51 The 
decedent had signed an agreement to arbitrate all claims arising from the medical care 
provided by the physician, expressly binding all persons with claims arising out of care 
provided by the physician to the decedent including any spouse or heirs.52 The claimant 
                                                                                                                                            
arbitrator raised reasonable doubt about arbitrator’s impartiality, and directing lower court to vacate 
arbitration award).  
46 Pelter v. 1-800-GET-THIN, No. B250124, 2014 WL 5449682, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014) 
(holding that defendant physicians had not established that they were parties to the arbitration agreement, 
and thus upholding denial of petition to compel arbitration). 
47 Ruiz v. Podolsky, 237 P.3d 584, 595 (Cal. 2010) (holding that arbitration agreement between decedent 
and surgeon bound heirs pursuing a wrongful death action). 
48 Id. at 586. 
49 Ruiz, 237 P.3d at 584. 
50 Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, 109 So.3d 752, 762 (Fla. 2013) (holding that arbitration agreement 
between decedent and nursing home bound estate and heirs in wrongful death action); Briarcliff Nursing 
Home v. Turcotte, 894 So.2nd 661, 665 (Ala. 2004) (holding that administratrix and executor of an estate 
“stand in the shoes of the decedent” and have no more power than decedent would have possessed). 
51 Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 50 (Utah 2008) (holding that decedent’s wife was not bound by 
arbitration agreement between decedent and physician, and was not required to arbitrate her wrongful death 
claim).  
52 The agreement stated:  
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asserted she was not bound by the arbitration agreement between the decedent and the 
physician. The court recognized a “strong public policy favoring arbitration,” but held 
that this policy was insufficient to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration contract.53  The 
Utah Constitution promises that the right to pursue a wrongful death claim cannot be 
abrogated.54 Furthermore, Utah law recognizes a wrongful death action as a separate 
claim, apart from a personal injury claim.55 Finally, the court held that the decedent’s 
spouse was not a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration clause.56 
Other state courts have also held that in wrongful death actions related to medical 
negligence claims against nursing homes, non-signatories cannot be bound to arbitration 
clauses signed by decedent.57   
In a very recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration of a wrongful death 
claim.  In Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, the Sixth Circuit considered a nursing 
and rehabilitation facility’s arbitration agreement that applied to all disputes, including 
wrongful death, that “binds [decedent] Charles Nichols and all persons with claims 
through or on behalf of him, including ‘any personal representative, responsible party, 
guardian, executor, administrator, legal representative, agent or heir’.”58 Declaring that 
the FAA does not alter basic principles of contract law, the court applied Kentucky state 
contract formation law and held that the wrongful death claim does not derive from any 
claim on behalf of the decedent and that executrix Adrianne Nichols was not a third party 
beneficiary of the agreement because the decedent simply had no authority to settle or 
                                                                                                                                            
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise 
out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this 
Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the 
time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim . . . . 
Id. at 42. 
53 Id. at 43. 
54 Id. at 44-45.  
55 Id. at 46. 
56 Bybee, 189 P.3d at 49-50.  
57 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 361 (Ill. 2012) (holding that a nonparty to a 
nursing home arbitration agreement cannot be bound by the agreement in a wrongful death action); Ping v. 
Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 600 (Ky. 2012) (holding claimants not bound by decedent’s 
arbitration agreement in wrongful death action against nursing home); Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 
S.W.3d 525, 530 (Mo. 2009) (holding that claimants not bound by arbitration agreement between decedent 
and nursing home in a wrongful death action); Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 873 N.E.2d 1258, 
1262 (Ohio 2007); Boler v. Sec. Health Care, 336 P.3d 468, 477 (Okla. 2014) (holding that arbitration 
agreement signed by decedent’s attorney  in fact not binding on personal representative and heirs in a 
wrongful death action against nursing home); Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 663 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2013).  
58 Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 194 (2016). 
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affect claims that belong to others.59  The Sixth Circuit Court additionally concluded that 
the state law was not pre-empted by the FAA under Concepcion because it did not 
categorically prohibit arbitration of all wrongful death claims, but instead held only that 
beneficiaries are not bound by agreements signed only by the decedent.60  Furthermore, 
unlike the California rule in Concepcion, the Kentucky rule did not make arbitration more 
cumbersome, costly, or more procedurally complicated.61 
III.   PURPORTED ADVANTAGES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION  
Academic observers have noted the potential benefits of arbitrating medical 
malpractice disputes for both claimants and physicians.62 Chief among the advantages 
cited have been quality of the decision-maker, speed of resolution, and reduced litigation 
expenses.63  
A.   Qualified Decision Makers 
Some writers do not believe lay juries possess the competence to decide medical 
malpractice cases.64 By allowing specialist neutrals to decide medical tort cases, some 
scholars believe results will be more accurate.65 In addition, qualified decision makers 
                                                
59 Id. at 195-97. The court noted that some jurisdictions hold that beneficiaries are bound by decedent’s 
arbitration agreements because under their state law the wrongful death claim is derivative, and some 
courts require arbitration even if the claim is not derivative. The court provided the following authorities: 
Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752,762 (Fla. 2013) (“[T]he nature of a wrongful death 
cause of action in Florida is derivative in the context of determining whether a decedent's estate and heirs 
are bound by the decedent's agreement to arbitrate.”); THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. 
App’x. 813, 817-18 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that, under New Mexico law, a wrongful death claim is a 
derivative action, and so non-signatory wrongful-death beneficiaries were bound by an arbitration 
provision). Similarly, other courts have held that a wrongful-death beneficiary was still subject to a 
decedent's arbitration agreement notwithstanding the independent nature of the claim. See, e.g., Allen v. 
Pacheco, 71 P.3d. 375, 379 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding that wrongful-death claim was required to be 
arbitrated under decedent's arbitration agreement even though claim was independent in nature); see 
generally Richmond Health Facilities, 811 F.3d at 196 n.3 (surveying relevant cases); Ping, 376 S.W.3d. at 
598 (collecting cases). 
60 Richmond Health Facilities, 811 F.3d at 198. 
61 Id. at 200. 
62 Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 
227 (1996) (summarizing benefits of arbitration for both claimants and physicians in medical malpractice); 
DeVille, supra note 5, at 339-42 (noting the potential benefits of arbitrating medical malpractice disputes, 
but also noting that these benefits may be more theoretical than real).   
63 Metzloff, supra note 62, at 227; DeVille, supra note 5, at 339-42. 
64 Metzloff, supra note 62, at 208. 
65 DeVille, supra note 5, at 341; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1021 (1996). 
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enhance efficiency of dispute resolution by obviating the need to educate a jury about 
medical practice and science.  
These advantages of decisional accuracy and efficiency should work to the 
advantage of both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs, however, may reasonably fear bias 
when decision makers and defendants share the same culture. Will doctors favor doctors? 
These fears may be overblown, however, as generally physicians do not serve as 
arbitrators.66 
In fact, physicians may have more concerns about the biases of neutrals than 
claimants. The Kaiser Permanente medical malpractice dispute arbitration process is 
probably more transparent than any other.67 Under this arbitration system, all arbitrators 
must be members of the State Bar of California, or retired state or federal judges.68  One 
claimed advantage of medical malpractice arbitration is the availability of expert 
arbitrators, but one quickly can see that medical practitioners are almost completely 
absent from the list. Although there are more than 350 individuals listed in the Office of 
the Independent Administrator’s “Names of Neutral Arbitrators,” only two individuals 
have the title of “Dr.” (which may indicate a medical/health science degree but could 
represent a Ph.D. in another field).69  And those two individuals, Drs. Urs Martin 
Laeuchli and Lawrence J. Rudd, also are  attorneys.70 Given the fact that attorneys are the 
                                                
66 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, QUALIFICATIONS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS FOR KAISER PERMANENTE’S 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION SYSTEM (amended Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/NA-
Qualifications-Amended-02-27-14.pdf (neutral arbitrators must be members of a state bar or retired 
judges); Practice: Health Care – Overview, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/healthcare#overview (when 
describing neutrals, states that “The JAMS Health Care Practice Group includes retired . . . judges and 
former litigators”) (last visited Aug. 12, 2016); Qualification Criteria and Responsibilities for Members of 
the AAA Panel of Healthcare Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.
org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003875 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (neutrals must be healthcare 
business executives, attorneys, or judges). 
67 An abundance of information about the Kaiser mandatory arbitration process and outcomes are available 
through its website. OFF. INDEP. ADMIN’R, HTTP://WWW.OIA-KAISERARB.COM/14 (last visited Aug. 15, 
2016). Caution is advised in interpreting the data, however. First, the information is aggregated data and 
includes more than just malpractice arbitration data; in 2014 93% of the arbitrated claims were for 
malpractice. Second, outcomes are reported for each year, but not for each claim; this may lead to 
inconsistencies between numerators and denominators when calculating percentages, as claims do not all 
open and close in the same year. Third, while medical malpractice actions do not always involve claims 
against physicians, the data as presented does not break down claims against doctors, nurses, pharmacists, 
etc., separately. 
68 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, supra note 66. 
69 See generally Names of Neutral Arbitrators, OFF. INDEP. ADMIN’R, http://www.oia-
kaiserarb.com/4/neutral-arbitrators/names-of-neutral-arbitrators (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). At this site, 
each neutral arbitrator is listed by name and title; the only suffixes listed are Esq. and Ret. [Judge] and the 
only titles are Mr., Ms.  Judge, Justice, (one) Honorable, (one) Chief, (one) Professor, and two attorney Drs. 
See OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA NAS (July 29, 2016), http://www.oia-
kaiserarb.com/pdfs/ncalnas.pdf [hereinafter NORTHERN CALIFORNIA NAS]; OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, 
SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA NAS (July 29, 2016), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/SDNAS.pdf; OFFICE OF 
THE INDEP. ADM’R, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA NAS (July 29, 2016), http://www.oia-
kaiserarb.com/pdfs/scalnas.pdf [hereinafter SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA NAS].  
70 See NORTHERN CALIFORNIA NAS, supra note 69, at 2; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA NAS, supra note 69, at 2. 
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individuals who initiate almost all the medical malpractice lawsuits against physicians, it 
does not require a great leap of faith to believe that physicians may not trust, or even like, 
attorneys.  And evidence exists that supports that belief.71 In light of the often strained 
and distrustful relationship between physicians and attorneys, no one should be surprised 
when physicians hesitate to place their professional futures in the hands of a single, or 
even a panel of three, attorney arbitrator(s).    
Physicians actually have good reason to prefer a trial by jury rather than either a 
trial by a judge or an arbitration before an attorney or a retired judge.  Juries find for 
physicians in nearly eighty percent of cases.72 There is evidence doctors win malpractice 
actions only about half as often when judges decide cases compared to when juries 
decide.73 A discrepancy this large is actually quite unusual and does not exist for other 
personal injury litigation.74 This discrepancy provides confirmation for survey data that 
juries may be predisposed toward physician defendants in malpractice disputes.75 
B.   Rapid Resolution   
Arbitration generally is regarded as more efficient in terms of time than litigation. 
There is no need to select and educate a jury, for instance.  There typically is less conflict 
over evidence because evidentiary rules usually are much more relaxed.  Discovery also 
is much more limited. As a result of these time-savings, arbitration claimants do not have 
to wait as long for compensation as they do in litigation, and defendant practitioners do 
not have to suffer through a lengthy period of uncertainty, self-doubt, and clouded 
reputation.  
An analysis of 1,452 litigated malpractice claims from throughout the United 
States reveals that the average time from opening the claim to closing it was three years.76 
In sharp contrast, the 604 disputes between Kaiser Permanente and its members that were 
arbitrated in 2014 were closed on average in less than one year.77 Thus, rapid resolution 
                                                
71 Peter D. Jacobson, Mutual Distrust: Mediating the Conflict Between Law and Medicine, 37 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 493, 499 (2007) (commenting on antagonism between doctors and lawyers); Andrew Jay McClurg, 
Fight Club: Doctors vs. Lawyers—A Peace Plan Grounded in Self-Interest, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 309, 313 
(2011) (documenting antagonism between doctors and lawyers, exploring the roots of this antagonism, and 
calling for improved relations). 
72 DeVille, supra note 5, at 368. 
73 Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1474 (2007) (reviewing jury research in 
medical malpractice trials).  
74 Peters, Jr., supra note 73, at 1474. 
75 Id. at 1482-83. 
76 David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2027 (2006) (an analysis of 1452 closed malpractice claims from 
throughout the United States). 
77 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. MANDATORY ARBITRATION SYSTEM FOR DISPUTES WITH 
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of claims is a real advantage of arbitration over litigation for both claimants and 
defendants.  
C.   Reduced Litigation Expenses 
As one would expect, medical malpractice litigation is expensive.78  In addition to 
filing fees and attorney’s fees common to any litigation, almost all medical malpractice 
claims require at least one, and often multiple, expert witnesses. Due to the great expense 
of litigating medical malpractice claims, an aggrieved patient usually needs to retain an 
attorney willing to pay litigation expenses until settlement. This has three consequences 
for the patient: (1) the patient is unlikely to find an attorney willing to take even a clear 
case of malpractice if the damages are small; (2) even if damages are high, and it seems 
malpractice occurred, an attorney still will not take the case unless the chance of winning 
justifies the expense of suing; and (3) even if the patient triumphs in court, her award will 
be substantially reduced after litigation expenses are paid.79 The fact that plaintiffs must 
overcome these consequences lends support to the perception that litigation is a more 
favorable dispute resolution process for medical practitioners than less costly arbitration.  
The first two points are particularly important and will be further discussed below.80  
While it is true that arbitrating medical malpractice claims probably is less 
expensive than litigating those same claims in court, the fact that a case will be heard by 
an arbitrator does not necessarily solve a claimant’s financial problems. Unless the 
claimant can work out a contingency fee arrangement with an attorney, upfront fees and 
out of pocket expenses (to pay neutrals, discovery costs, and expert witnesses) may still 
be quite high for the plaintiff. This can discourage the plaintiff from even initiating a 
claim in either forum.81  
As compared to claimants, litigation expenses may be much less of a deterrence 
for physicians because many, if not almost all, of these expenses  likely are covered by 
                                                                                                                                            
HEALTH PLAN MEMBERS 26 (2015), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/2014-Annual-Report.pdf (93% of 
new cases in 2014 were medical malpractice cases). 
78 Seth Seabury et al., Defense Costs of Medical Malpractice Claims, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354,1355 
(2012) (An analysis of 26,853 malpractice claims that closed between 1995 and 2005 showed average costs 
of defending a claim of $17,130 when no payment was made and $45,070 when a payment was made); 
Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 151, 185 (2014) (A 2012 online survey of plaintiff’s attorneys revealed these average litigation 
expenses: cases dismissed without payment, $18,062.76; cases settled with payment, $58,275.89; cases 
resulting in jury verdict for plaintiff, $97,369.79). 
79 A 2012 online survey of plaintiff’s attorneys asked about expected damages required to take a case of 
medical malpractice. Shepherd, supra note 78. The median expected damages threshold to take a case with 
a 95% chance of winning was $250,000. Id. at 187-88. For cases with a 51% chance of winning the median 
threshold was $500,000. Id. For cases with a 25% chance of winning the median threshold was $1,000,000. 
Id. This same study revealed average contingent fees of about 35%, and contingent fees greater than 40% in 
about 8.5% of cases ending in settlement. Id. at 184. 
80 See infra Part V.D.  
81 See DeVille, supra note 5, at 370. 
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malpractice insurance.82 Although incurred litigation costs may affect future malpractice 
insurance premiums, the cost saving advantages of arbitration to the physician him or 
herself, and the benefit that defending an arbitration in lieu of a trial may have for 
insurance premiums, may be too small to influence a physician’s preference for 
arbitration or  litigation.  
IV.   PATIENTS POTENTIALLY ARE WELL SERVED BY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ARBITRATION 
If the problem of upfront fees and out of pocket expenses can be overcome, then 
the rapid resolution of disputes and the reduced cost of pursuing a claim should make 
arbitration an attractive option for the health care consumer. The Kaiser Permanente 
arbitration system solves the problem of neutral fees by paying all of these costs for the 
claimant if the claimant agrees to waive its party arbitrator.83 In 2014, Kaiser paid the 
neutral arbitrator fee in ninety percent of cases.84 Kaiser will also waive the $150 
Arbitration Filing Fee in cases of hardship; in 2014 the Office of the Independent 
Arbitrator granted a waiver for fifty of the fifty-three requests.85 
V.   PHYSICIANS ARE NOT WELL SERVED BY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION 
In almost every medical malpractice claim, there are at least two parties with an 
interest in a finding of non-negligence: the insurer and the physician. The motivations of 
these parties are not the same, however. On the one hand, the insurer wants to keep the 
total cost (cost of litigation plus awarded damages) of the suit as low as possible. On the 
other hand, the physician is less concerned with the cost of the suit, which in most cases 
                                                
82 David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, 
Stupid, 59 VAND. L REV. 1085, 1127 n.140 (2006) (reporting that “insured providers contribute personal 
assets to judgments or settlements” in less than one percent of cases). 
83 Disputes in the Kaiser system seeking damages of $200,000 or less are heard by one arbitrator, unless the 
parties agree that the dispute will be heard by one neutral arbitrator and two party arbitrators. OFFICE OF 
THE INDEP. ADM’R, RULES FOR KAISER PERMANENTE MEMBER ARBITRATIONS 4 (amended Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/Rules.pdf. Disputes seeking more than $200,000 are heard by one 
neutral arbitrator and two party arbitrators. Id. However, Kaiser will pay all neutral fees in a dispute 
seeking damages of $200,000 or less if the claimant waives any present or future claims based on Kaiser’s 
payment of neutral fees. See id. at 4-5. In the case of claims exceeding $200,000, Kaiser will be pay all 
neutral fees if the claimant agrees to a hearing by one arbitrator, and waives any present or future claims 
based on Kaiser’s payment of neutral fees. Id. See generally Explanation of Waivers, OFF. INDEP. ADM’R, 
http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/45/forms/forms-for-parties/explanation-of-waivers (last visited Nov. 22, 
2015).  
84 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, supra note 77. 
85 Id. at 34.    
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is entirely covered by the insurer.86  Instead, the physician is apprehensive about 
maintaining both a self-image and a reputation of competence.  
Physicians are aware they likely will be sued at some point in their careers. A 
recent study estimated that physicians in high litigation risk specialties (e.g., 
neurosurgery, general surgery) faced a ninety-nine percent probability of being sued for 
malpractice by age sixty-five; physicians in low litigation risk specialties (e.g., 
nephrology, psychiatry) faced a seventy-five percent chance of being sued by age sixty-
five.87  
Given these odds, physicians take the risk of a malpractice suit seriously. So long 
as physicians have a significant voice in determining the forum where malpractice claims 
will be heard, they will have to be convinced that the forum will protect not just the 
economic interests of the insurer and physician, but also the intangible self-image and 
reputation interests of the physician. 
Physicians worry that arbitration will not adequately protect their intangible 
interests.88 Physicians seek to be held blameless, and arbitration is perceived as too prone 
to compromise.89 Some writers acknowledge this point of view, but do not consider it 
reasonable in the context of modern arbitration which protects against trivial claims.90 
But even if it is true that arbitration reduces unworthy claims, a physician’s intangible 
interests are no less threatened by nontrivial claims.  
A.   Arbitration Perceived as Prone to Compromise 
Empirical evidence that arbitration is a forum prone to compromise is scant.91 In 
this regard, however, perception can be more important than reality. Large numbers of 
corporate counsel believe arbitration leads to compromise awards.92 The California 
                                                
86 Hyman & Silver, supra note 82, at 1126-27 (explaining that a malpractice insurer sometimes needs the 
consent of the defendant to settle, that defendants are almost always shielded from the cost of settlement, 
and that defendants are concerned about the “reputational” and “reporting” effects of a settlement). 
87 Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629, 
632-33 (2011) (analyzing the database of a large national malpractice insurer to determine risk of a claim, 
and the percentage of claims resulting in payment to the plaintiff).  
88 Metzolff, supra note 62, at 220 (arguing that arbitration is perceived by physicians as too prone to 
compromise).  
89 Metzolff, supra note 62, at 220 
90 Gilles, supra note 3, at 682-83.  
91 Carter Greenbaum, Putting the Baby to Rest: Dispelling a Common Arbitration Myth, 26 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 101 (2015) (reviewing empirical evidence that arbitration tends toward compromise decisions and 
reporting original data).  
92 DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE., BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 11 (2011) (reporting that of 121 corporate counsel 
who responded to an internet survey, 71% believed that arbitrators tended to “split the baby”); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, 
and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 53 (2014) (reporting 
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Supreme Court has acknowledged the perception that arbitration is more likely to 
produce a compromise decision.93 Judge Richard Posner has commented on “the 
splitting-the-difference character of arbitration.”94  
A rational physician, believing that she practices quality medicine, may desire her 
day in court, a forum seen as less prone to compromise.  The feeling is that litigation is 
where strong cases are vindicated.  And this feeling is reinforced by the success rates 
physicians have achieved when malpractice cases are decided by juries.  Physicians’ 
preference for litigation is consistent with a touted corporate strategy: “[A] company that 
believes it has a strong legal and factual position may want to avoid arbitration, with its 
tendency to ‘split the difference,’ in favor of a judicial forum where it may be more likely 
to win a clear-cut victory.”95 
B.   Intangible Concerns 
1.   Self-Image 
A doctor sued for malpractice suffers emotionally and can interpret the lawsuit as 
a personal attack.96 Some scholars have hypothesized that the defendant physician’s self-
esteem is the dominant nonmonetary concern in a malpractice action.97 To defend herself 
from what she perceives as an unwarranted attack on her competence, and to protect her 
self-image, a physician seeks complete vindication. Complete vindication cannot be 
found in a forum prone to compromise.  
2.   Reputational Concerns 
a.   Name Clearing 
It certainly is true that some physicians value the “name clearing” function of the 
                                                                                                                                            
that 42-47% of corporate attorneys indicated that they had not used arbitration in certain cases because it 
“results in compromised outcomes”).  
93 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 693 (Cal. 2000) (discussing discovery and 
adherence to the law as advantages of courtroom litigation over arbitration).  
94 Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
1259, 1261 (2005). 
95 Corp. Counsel Section of the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Report on Cost-Effective Management of Corporate 
Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 263, 272 (1995). See also Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 693. 
96 McClurg, supra note 71, at 348. 
97 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection 
of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 365 (1991) (analyzing 529 civil jury trials in California). 
 
 85 
judicial process.98  When physicians are accused of negligence, they want their day in 
court and the court’s public declaration that the care they provided met or exceeded 
professional standards. This interest is similar to the physician’s self-image concern, but 
here the desire is for external vindication rather than internal vindication.  Just as with 
self-image concerns, arbitration is seen as a forum friendly to compromise.99  And a 
compromise award does not completely vindicate the physician’s action, but rather does 
the opposite—it is a declaration that the physician did something wrong.  
It can be argued that because arbitration is private and typically confidential, no 
one will know a physician has been named in a malpractice action.  Therefore, name 
clearing will be unnecessary.   
It is impossible, however, for a physician to keep malpractice actions entirely 
private. At a minimum, as further explained below, malpractice actions that are open at 
the time of credentialing or re-credentialing will be known to hospital re-credentialing 
staff personnel, the hospital credentialing committee, the hospital executive committee, 
and the hospital board of directors.100 Any money paid on behalf of the physician as a 
result of a settlement, judgment, or arbitration award will be known to these same staff 
and committee members, and also must be reported to the state medical board in many 
states as well as the National Practitioner Data Bank.101 The existence and nature of these 
regulatory requirements, of course, provide an example of how politics can influence the 
desirability of arbitration.   
In addition, medical insurance staff will know of the suit, as will attorneys 
involved in the case. Expert witnesses will know of the suit. Finally, close family 
members will know of the malpractice action. With the accusation of negligence known 
to so many, the name clearing function of litigation remains an important consideration.  
b.   Hospital Credentialing and State Licensing 
When applying for hospital privileges, a physician must usually report any history 
of malpractice claims.102 Jury verdicts and settlements are considered “red flags,” and 
                                                
98 Id. Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1173-74 (1990). 
99 Metzoloff, supra note 62, at 220.  
100 In a typical process, hospital credentialing staff collect all credentialing data and present it to the 
hospital credentialing committee; the credentialing committee reviews the physician file and makes a 
recommendation regarding credentialing to the executive committee; the executive committee approves or 
rejects the recommendation and forwards their decision to the hospital board of directors; and the board 
makes the final decision to grant or deny hospital privileges. EDWARD E. HOLLOWELL & JENNIFER L. 
SMITH, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, PART II BUSINESS ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, 
CHAPTER 11 COPROVIDERS AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 99 (2007), 
http://www.ablminc.org/model_curriculum_lmme_2010/book_legal%20medicine-7th_2007/ch11-
coproviders%20&%20institutional%20practice.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).  
101 See infra Parts V.B.2.b., V.B.2.c. 
102 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION MEDICAL STAFF SERVICES, THE IDEAL CREDENTIALING STANDARDS: BEST 
PRACTICE CRITERIA AND PROTOCOL FOR HOSPITALS (Feb. 2014), http://www.namss.org/Portals
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result in greater scrutiny of the application.103 In addition, physicians generally must 
undergo a re-credentialing process every two years at all hospitals where they hold 
privileges.104 Physicians must update their files with a report of all malpractice claims 
paid since they were last credentialed. These settlements, judgments, and arbitration 
awards must be explained.  So physicians obviously will be worried that any payment 
will make it more difficult to obtain or retain hospital privileges. 
In addition, some states require malpractice settlements and awards be reported to 
the state board of medical practice.105 A report of malpractice can trigger an investigation 
and discipline by the licensing board. Thus, because of the rules and politics of hospital 
credentialing and state licensing, any money paid as a result of a malpractice claim will 
be perceived as career threatening.  
c.   National Practitioner Data Bank 
Physicians have a powerful interest in not being listed in the National Practitioner 
Data Bank (NPDB). Although the enabling legislation for the NPDB, the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) was passed by Congress four years 
earlier,106 the NPDB did not begin collecting reports on medical malpractice payments or 
adverse licensure, clinical privileges, and professional society membership actions taken 
against practitioners until September 1, 1990.107  Among other provisions, it requires that 
all payments in satisfaction of a medical malpractice claim be reported to the NPDB.108 




104 THE JOINT COMM’N, CREDENTIALING STANDARD (2011), http://www.jointcommission.org/as
sets/1/18/20110705_LTC_Credentialing.pdf. 
105 Compare MED. BD. OF CAL., MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA LICENSING PROGRAM APPLICATION (rev. 
2013), http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Forms/Applicants/US-Canada/us-application_forms_l1a-l1f.pdf (requires 
reporting of any “claim or action” filed against the applicant that resulted in a malpractice settlement, and 
also any “judgment or arbitration” awarded in the amount of $30,000 or more), with MINN. BD. OF MED. 
PRACTICE, MALPRACTICE HISTORY REPORT (2014), https://mn.gov/boards
/assets/Malpractice_History_Report_2006a.pdf_tcm21-36592.pdf (requires reporting of “any medical 
malpractice settlement or award relating to the quality of medical treatment”), and Medical Malpractice 
Questions 2012 Physician License Renewal Application, VT. MED. SOCT’Y http://www.vtmd.org/medical-m
alpractice-questions-2012-physician-license-renewal-application (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (Vermont 
Board of Medical Practice requires reporting “about pending claims and claims that resulted in court 
judgments, arbitration awards or settlements”). 
106 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. IV, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. ch. 117 (2016)). 
107 NPDB Timeline, NAT’L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb.hrs
a.gov/topNavigation/timeline.jsp (last visited March 24, 2016). 
108 42 U.S.C.A § 11131 (West 2015). 
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This requirement includes arbitration awards.109 Furthermore, it requires that all hospitals 
access this information when first credentialing a physician, and at least every two years 
afterwards, so long as the physician remains on the hospital staff.110 A hospital that does 
not request this information as required is presumed to have knowledge of the 
information in any medical malpractice action.111  The NPDB can also be accessed by 
insurers and used to inform decision-making about whether to include a physician in a 
provider network.112 Professor Van Tassel has likened listing in the NPDB to being 
“blacklisted.”113  
To avoid the potentially devastating consequences of mandatory reporting, it is 
believed that many physicians are willing to settle only the strongest cases against 
them.114 In all other cases, the physician has a strong incentive to litigate.115  And again, 
one can see the effect that politics, albeit commendatory and even essential, can have on 
the attractiveness of arbitration.  
C.   Privacy 
Privacy often is listed as one of the advantages of arbitration. For the healthcare 
provider, however, this purported benefit is often illusory. As explained above, any 
damages paid to a claimant will be known to some hospital personnel and must be 
reported during credentialing or re-credentialing.  Those payments also must be reported 
to the NPDB. In regard to these disclosures, which have significant consequences for 
physicians, arbitration is no more private than a trial.  
And even though medical malpractice trials take place in an open courtroom, 
these trials, generally, are not widely publicized.116  Thus, the promised privacy benefit of 
arbitration over a trial may not be compelling for a physician.  Any small privacy 
advantage that arbitration may offer is heavily outweighed by the self-image and name 
clearing advantages of courtroom litigation, as described above.  
                                                
109 Nevers, supra note 5, at 73 (summarizing information regarding the NPDB as a potential disincentive 
for physicians to arbitrate). 
110 42 U.S.C.A. § 11135(a). 
111 42 U.S.C.A. § 11135(b). 
112 Nevers, supra note 5, at 73.  
113 Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System For Publishing 
Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031 (2012) 
(focusing on the career impairing results of listing on the NPDB after an adverse peer review; the same 
negative consequences can follow listing for a malpractice settlement, and it is likely physicians fear NPDB 
listing for any cause). 
114 Metzloff, supra note 62, at 220.  
115 Id. at 205-206; Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging the 
Data Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109 (2012) (arguing that the NPDB makes early dispute 
resolution unattractive to physicians). 
116 Gross & Syverud, supra note 97, at 365. 
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D.   Physicians Fare Well in Medical Malpractice Litigation  
Medical malpractice plaintiffs face daunting challenges. First, a potential litigant 
must find an attorney to take her case. Without an attorney, a plaintiff has virtually no 
chance of winning a medical malpractice trial.117  In arbitration, however, an aggrieved 
patient can pursue a claim without a lawyer. For example, in 2014 twenty-five percent of 
claimants in the Kaiser system proceeded pro se.118  
Because it is expensive to bring a medical malpractice claim, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
turn down many cases. Malpractice attorneys, typically proceeding under a contingent fee 
arrangement, decline to take at least eighty percent of the cases offered to them.119 A 
plaintiff’s attorney may not take a case because she estimates the chances of winning are 
too low, or because damages recovered will be too small to justify the expense of 
pursuing the claim.120 The reality is that small claims against physicians simply are not 
litigated,121 and most potential claims against physicians are small.122  Because arbitration 
may remove, or at least reduce, barriers to asserting small claims, physicians may 
reasonably fear that arbitration will increase the number of claims they will have to 
defend.   
As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that physicians currently enjoy a pro-
defendant bias in medical malpractice litigation.123 Professor Peters reviewed a large 
amount of empiric data concerning jury accuracy and bias in medical malpractice 
trials.124 He found that juries decided for plaintiffs in ten to twenty percent of cases where 
independent reviewers did not find evidence of negligence.125 An erroneous finding of 
negligence in up to twenty percent of jury trials is a disturbing statistic for physicians to 
contemplate.  At the other end of the spectrum, however, in those cases where 
independent reviewers thought there very likely was negligence, plaintiffs won only 
about fifty percent of the cases.126 Furthermore, juries find for plaintiffs in medical 
                                                
117 Hyman & Silver, supra note 82, at 1117. 
118 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, supra note 77. 
119 Hyman & Silver, supra note 82, at 1102 (reviewing the “sorting function” of medical malpractice 
claimant’s attorneys). 
120 Hyman & Silver, supra note 82, at 1115 (explaining that the expected value of a claim is equal to the 
expected recovery “discounted by the probability of obtaining it”).  
121 Id. at 1118 (contrasting the likelihood of bringing a small claim for medical malpractice with the 
likelihood of bringing a similar-sized claim for an auto accident).  
122 Id. at 1114 (reviewing data from two studies). 
123 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
124 Peters, supra note 73, at 1454. 
125 Id. at 1492. 
126 Id. at 1492. 
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malpractice cases only about half as often as judges do.127 Summarizing the data, 
Professor Peters believes that physicians have a genuine advantage in jury trials.128  To 
make the case in favor of litigation even stronger, defendants in medical malpractice 
trials fare at least as well, and perhaps better, on appeal than do plaintiffs.129  A 
physician’s ability to even attempt to vacate an unfavorable arbitration award, in contrast, 
is much more limited than his or her opportunity to appeal an unfavorable trial 
judgment.130 
VI.   CURRENT AND FUTURE STATUS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION  
A.   Current Status 
The use of arbitration to settle medical malpractice claims appears to be extremely 
uncommon in some states, but arbitration is used in other jurisdictions.  Nowhere, 
however, is it typical to resolve medical malpractice claims by arbitration.131 One 
putative advantage of arbitration is that it is private. As discussed above, this advantage 
may be more illusory than real, but it does make it extremely difficult to know how 
arbitration actually functions in medical malpractice cases.  
The best window on medical arbitration, as it is actually practiced in the United 
States, is provided by the Kaiser Permanente Health Plan. In California, all Kaiser 
Permanente enrollees must sign an agreement to arbitrate, among other things, claims of 
medical malpractice by any Kaiser doctor.132 Kaiser provides a wealth of current and 
historical information about its arbitration process.133 It is impossible to say if the Kaiser 
                                                
127 Id. at 1474 (This is in contrast to most other forms of civil litigation, where there are similar outcomes 
between jury and bench trials.). 
128 Id. at 1493 (hypothesizing that this advantage is most likely the result of one or more of three factors: 
jury distrust of malpractice claimants; more skilled and persuasive defense attorneys and experts; and 
scrupulous adherence to the burden of proof, where juries find for the defendant when testimony for both 
parties is believable). 
129 In a study of appealed state court decisions, including both bench and jury trials, defendants in medical 
malpractice actions achieved reversal or remand in 33.3% of cases, as compared to 23.9% of cases for 
plaintiffs. Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study of 
State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 134 (2009) This difference was not significantly 
different, but when all civil actions were considered, defendants were successful in 41.5% of cases, 
whereas plaintiffs were successful in only 21.5%, a difference that was statistically significant. Id. 
130 Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2016). 
131 See generally Schwartz, supra note 3. 
132 Shieh, supra note 35, at 1826 (reviewing the evolution and current state of medical malpractice 
arbitration at Kaiser Permanente). 
133 The Office of the Independent Administrator, which oversees arbitrations between Kaiser and its 
members, provides information about Kaiser arbitration rules, forms, arbitrators, annual reports dating back 
to 1999, and the 1998 Blue Ribbon Report, which was prompted by Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 
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arbitration process is typical of medical malpractice arbitration, as every contract between 
provider and patient will be different. Nevertheless, Kaiser participates in hundreds of 
malpractice arbitrations every year and provides detailed summary data of these 
proceedings.  
The Office of the Independent Administrator for the Kaiser mandatory arbitration 
process reports that in 2014 there were 630 demands for arbitration.134 Of these, 588 were 
demands for arbitration of medical malpractice claims.135 If the claimant would agree to 
use only a neutral arbitrator, then Kaiser paid all arbitrator fees. In 2014 Kaiser paid these 
fees in ninety percent of the cases.136  
In twenty-five percent of the cases, the claimant proceeded pro se.137  Although 
one of the advantages of arbitration for plaintiffs is that it is at least possible to proceed 
pro se in arbitration (whereas it is almost impossible in litigation), in this small sample 
pro se claimants did not fare well. Claimants were pro se in only three of the fifty-six 
cases decided after a hearing, and the claimant won only one of those cases.138 In cases 
that settled before a hearing, the claimant was pro se in only nine percent.139  
Fifty-six cases were fully arbitrated in 2014.140 Of these, Kaiser prevailed in sixty-
eight percent and the claimant prevailed in thirty-two percent.141 In the eighteen cases 
that resulted in awards to the claimant, those awards ranged from $7,000 to $2,181,375 
(median award $250,000 and average award $597,342).142 In addition to the fully 
arbitrated claims, forty-six percent of claims were settled before a final judgment.143   
It is difficult to make a direct comparison between these cases and cases that are 
litigated.  It may be easier for pro se plaintiffs to proceed in arbitration, for instance, but 
at least in this system they did not experience much success.  The poor results for the 
claimants in the twenty-five percent of cases pursued pro se might have occurred because 
they were weak cases, and the claimants were pro se because no attorney would take such 
a weak case.  Alternatively, the cases might have been reasonable, but the pro se 
                                                                                                                                            
938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), a California Supreme Court decision critical of Kaiser’s former arbitration 
process. See generally OFF. INDEP. ADMIN’R, supra note 67. 
134 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, supra note 77, at ix. 
135 Id. at 12 (other claims were for other torts, premises liability, benefits disputes, and liens).  
136 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, supra note 77, at viii.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 30.  
139 Id. at 28.  
140 Id. at 28-30 (46% of all cases resulted in settlement, 24% in claimant withdrawal, 4% in abandonment 
by the claimant, 3% in dismissal by the arbitrator, 13% in summary judgment, and 9% in a post-hearing 
decision). 
141 OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, supra note 77, at 30.  
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 28 (reporting that settlements represented forty-six percent of closures). 
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claimants may have been very ineffective representing themselves.  One should note that 
not all of the cases involved medical malpractice claims: Only ninety-three percent of the 
Kaiser claims were for medical malpractice.144 Furthermore, all of these cases were from 
one region of the United States, so comparisons with national data might be misleading.  
Keeping these caveats in mind, the Kaiser outcomes nonetheless do seem 
consistent with those obtained through litigation. One study indicated plaintiffs receive a 
monetary settlement in fifty-six percent of malpractice actions in litigation.145 Plaintiffs 
win 26.8 percent of medical malpractice cases that are decided at trial.146 The cases that 
proceeded to an arbitration hearing were settled much faster than those that proceed to a 
judgment in court.147  
Looking at the arbitral awards obtained through the Kaiser data, one might 
suspect the physicians’ fear of arbitration is misplaced.  But the sample is so small that it 
is impossible to draw any reliable conclusions.  Obviously more empirical evidence 
would be extremely helpful, but it typically is unavailable.  While these results do raise 
the possibility that physicians will not fair as badly in arbitration as they believe, the 
arbitral awards still were not as favorable for physicians as the outcomes in jury trials.     
B.   The Future 
Although pre-dispute arbitration agreements to decide malpractice claims against 
physicians are not commonly used in states such as Minnesota, for instance, this situation 
certainly could change.148 Litigation may become somewhat more favorable for 
claimants, and correspondingly less for physicians, as legislatures and courts adjust the 
balance of power in medical malpractice suits.149 For instance, a new opportunity for 
plaintiffs was created when the Minnesota Supreme Court recently adopted the loss of 
chance doctrine for medical malpractice,150 a doctrine that is not unique to Minnesota.   
And as noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court continues to uphold 
arbitration agreements that are particularly helpful for defendants.151 If statutes are 
                                                
144 Id. at 11. 
145 Shepherd, supra note 78, at 183 (reporting results of a 2012 online survey of 464 plaintiff’s attorneys). 
146 Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 129, at 137 (citing United States Department of Justice statistics). 
147 See supra Part III.B.  
148 See Carol A. Crocca, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 24 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1994) (citing no 
Minnesota cases in Table of Cases); Pedroni & Vadi, supra note 5, at 58. Search of the WestlawNext 
database on October 3, 2015 revealed no cases decided by Minnesota state courts or Minnesota cases 
decided by United States federal courts. Search terms were “arbitration” and “medical malpractice,” limited 
to “Minnesota” and without date limitation. 
149 Gilles, supra note 3, at 690-94.  
150 Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013) (holding that a loss of chance claim is cognizable in 
Minnesota; this doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover damages if her chance of recovery or survival was 
substantially reduced, even if her chance was less than fifty percent at the outset). 
151 See supra Part II.A.      
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enacted and court rules adopted that make courtrooms less hospitable to physicians, data 
is collected that shows that physicians do not lose more frequently or suffer larger 
damage awards in arbitration than in court (including jury trials), and the pro-arbitration 
judicial opinions currently being written continue, then more pre-dispute medical 
malpractice arbitration agreements  likely will be written.  Those are some big “ifs,” 
however. 
Given the potentially severe consequences, physicians understandably are very 
concerned about malpractice claims.  At least for the time being, they are more 
comfortable with judicial processes than they are with arbitration.  The comparative costs 
inherent in each of these two dispute resolution processes are not likely to sway physician 
preference for the courthouse over arbitration.  Physicians are more concerned about the 
implications for licensing and accreditation (our political environment), as well as for 
self-image and reputation, whenever any dollar amount is paid in settlement.  And 
regardless of whether it is correct or not, the belief persists that a compromise award 
resulting in at least some payment is more likely in arbitration than the courtroom.    
Of course, prediction is hard, especially about the future.152 This analysis would 
change dramatically if some form of the Arbitration Fairness Act was signed into law. 
This Act, as proposed in 2015,153 would prohibit binding pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements involving consumers. Medical malpractice arbitration may become even 
more unlikely.  While a binding post-dispute arbitration agreement still would be 
possible, physicians probably would not choose this option unless it was perceived as 
offering a more favorable forum for vindication than litigation.  
One increasingly common employment arrangement may result in more medical 
malpractice arbitration. The percentage of physicians in independent practice has been 
decreasing for years.154  As doctors shift from being independent professionals to 
employees of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and hospitals, they may have 
to agree as a condition of employment that both they, and their patients (who will agree 
to a similar contract clause), will resolve medical malpractice claims in arbitration. But 
although business entities may be more persuaded than doctors to choose arbitration 
because of its lower costs, so long as it is significantly more likely that a medical 
malpractice claim can be successfully defended before a jury rather than an arbitrator, 
these employers still may prefer the courtroom to defend malpractice claims.  The 
businesses instead may limit their pre-dispute arbitration agreements to the doctors’ own 
employment related problems.   
                                                
152 The provenance of this expression is unknown. It has been attributed to Yogi Berra and Niels Bohr, 
among others. However, it first appeared in print in 1948, and was said to be a pun heard in the Danish 
parliament. It’s Difficult to Make Predictions, Especially About the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Oct. 20, 
2013), http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/. 
153 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015). 





Benefiting from the Federal Arbitration Act and favorable Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, pre-dispute arbitration agreements have become the norm in American 
life. Even businesses in the medical field such as nursing homes, for example, have 
accepted pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a strategy to control the costs of 
negligence actions. Physicians, however, have not embraced arbitration as a means of 
resolving malpractice disputes.  
There are several reasons for this anomaly. First, two of the advertised advantages 
of arbitration over litigation—qualified decision makers and lower expenses than 
litigation —may not resonate with physicians. Doctors would rather entrust their fate to a 
jury of laypersons than a panel of attorneys and retired judges, and doctors are shielded 
from the cost of litigation by insurance.  
When a physician is accused of malpractice, her overarching concerns are likely 
to be internal self-image and external reputation, not economic considerations. The 
doctor wants to vindicate her own competence, clear her name, avoid having to declare a 
malpractice settlement when credentialing, steer clear of any licensing complications a 
malpractice settlement might create and, above all, keep her name out of the National 
Practitioner Data Base. The reporting requirements, and the way that these requirements 
discourage physicians from choosing arbitration, is an example of how politics have 
affected medical malpractice arbitration.  These very real concerns often are threatened as 
much by a small monetary settlement as by a large settlement.  The danger is in the 
settlement, not the amount.  
Doctors will choose the forum that provides the best opportunity for total 
vindication. Under current conditions, that forum is the courtroom. In the courtroom the 
physician is protected by the full array of procedural safeguards, can fully utilize 
depositions and discovery, and, importantly, can explain her action to a sympathetic jury. 
In contrast, arbitration is viewed as a process prone to undesired compromise.  
One development could make pre-dispute binding medical malpractice arbitration 
agreements more common.  Judicial or legislative initiatives might make litigation less 
favorable for physicians. This could tip the balance toward arbitration. At present, 
however, the unique concerns of physicians make even pre-dispute binding arbitration 
unattractive compared to litigation.   
